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The skyrocketing costs of land acquisition for major public
undertakings, together with increased sensitivity to the tremen-
dous impact such undertakings have on surrounding land uses,
have led to attempts to ameliorate the effects of both. Proceed-
ing under a grant from the U.S. Department of Transportation,
the Rice Center for Community Design & Research in Houston,
Texas, has undertaken to suggest alternatives to present methods
of land acquisition and land use in order to: 1) lessen the ulti-
mate financial burden on public agencies, and 2) increase the
community benefits directly resulting from such projects.
The Center has taken a proposed mass transit system for the City
of Houston as its model. This article, written by the participants
principally responsible for the legal aspects of the study, sum-
marizes existing law and suggests possible alternative methods of
value recapture to benefit the public. The value to be recaptured
is "created" in a given area by the vast expenditure of public
funds that inevitably accompanies a major public project such
as a fixed-guideway rapid transit system.
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INTRODUCTION-THE PROBLEM
The fuel crisis, increased federal funding, and center city develop-
ment and redevelopment suggest an increased need for the construc-
tion and operation of fixed-guideway rapid transit systems in urban
areas.' As a result, privately-owned land near transit stations and
stops will probably increase in value due to the enhanced commercial,
industrial and residential development potential created by superior
access and the concurrent generation of intense local activity.2 It is
arguable that the enrichment is unearned since it does not result
from any expenditure by the private landowner and therefore should
accrue instead to the public agency that incurred substantial expen-
ditures in the construction of the public facility that causes the value
increase in the first place. If the public agency could "recapture" this
public-development-related increase in value, the result would be a
corresponding reduction in the public cost. This Article explores pro-
posed solutions to the value recapture problem based on so-called "sup-
plemental" or "excess" condemnation, tax assessments, intergovern-
mental cooperation, and air and subsurface rights development.
I. PUBLIC USE AND SUPPLEMENTAL CONDEMNATION
A. Public Use
We assume arguendo that the public authority created will have
the power to acquire land by eminent domain for the fixed-guideways
(rails, supports, etc.) and stations. It is black letter law that in order
to exercise the power of eminent domain, the governmental unit
must be acquiring the subject property for a "public use."8 In gen-
eral, however, most courts will accept a reasonable legislative declara-
tion of public purpose, absent fraud or gross misuse of power. Thus,
1. Houston is a recent example; new systems are completed or under construc-
tion in Washington, D.C., and San Francisco.
2. For an excellent analysis of the relationship between rapid transit facilities,
land use, and land value see S. LANGFELD, THE BALANCED AND ORDERLY DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE SITE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO A METROPOLITAN STATION AS A
CONTRIBUTION TO A MORE HEALTHY AND ECONOMICALLY VIABLE URBAN ENVIR-
ONMENT IN THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 2-10, 18-30 (1971) [herein-
after cited as LANGFELD]. The examples from Toronto and San Francisco demon-
strate the advantages of incentive zoning as used by the latter for its BART system.
3. For cases and commentaries discussing "public use" and its definition in
terms of its necessity for the exercise of the power of eminent domain see 11 E.
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.02 (rev. 3d ed. 1964); 2A P.
NICHOLS, THE LAW oP EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.1 (rev. 3d ed. 1970); C. RHYNE,
MUNICIPAL LAW § 17-2 (1957).
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when the Texas legislature declared the acquisition of land around
a public facility and within a navigation district to be for a public
use and a public purpose, the court bowed to that legislative determi-
nation:
The cited cases are authority for the proposition that the courts
should not intervene where the particular undertaking of the
Legislature has a real and substantial relation to the public
use.... Consequently, the implied declaration by the legislative
branch of government, that a taking under a right of eminent
domain was for the public use, will be given deference by the
courts, until it is shown to involve an impossibility.4
B. Supplemental Condemnation
Short of a constitutional or statutory prohibition against the ex-
penditure of public funds for certain purposes, so-called "supplemen-
tal" or "excess" property could probably be purchased if the land-
owner either requests that it be acquired, or in some fashion volun-
tarily agrees to sell it to the public agency.5 We address ourselves, there-
fore, to the problem of "supplemental" or "excess" condemnation.6
The principal bar to supplemental condemnation is generally con-
sidered to be the Sixth Circuit's decision in City of Cincinnati v.
Vester.7 Acting under a provision of the Ohio Constitution expressly
permitting excess condemnation, the City of Cincinnati passed an
ordinance to widen an existing public street. The ordinance con-
demned more adjacent land than was necessary for widening the road,
and included three fairly extensive lots, only two of which abutted
the street to be widened. The lot owners sued the city alleging that
the taking was not for a public purpose and was therefore in violation
of the due process clause of the United States Constitution, and that
it contravened the requirement of the Ohio Constitution that a
condemnation be for a public use.
The Ohio Constitution expressly permits not only excess condem-
4. Atwood v. Willacy County' Navigation Dist., 271 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 804 (1955) (emphasis added).
Accord, United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970);
West v. Whitehead, 238 S.W. 976 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
5. This is virtually black letter law. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 297, 319 (1966).
6. The term "supplemental" condemnation should be used whenever possible
on the ground that it connotes a less prolifigate use of public funds than the word
"excers."
7. 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929), affd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
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nation, but also later resale of the excess. 8 The court discussed three
theories that generally justify excess condemnation-the remnant
theory, the protection theory, and the recoupment theory. The court
decided that the city had relied solely upon the recoupment theory
(i.e., disposing of the property not needed for street purposes at prices
that would enable the city to recoup much of the street construction
cost). After discussing the requirement that some benefit must flow
to the public and that the public interest must be so paramount as to
require the subject property for public use, the court held, referring
to the aforementioned state constitutional provision: "If it means, as
the city here contends, that property may be taken for the purpose
of selling it at a profit and paying for the improvement, it is clearly
invalid."9 It is worth noting, however, that the court emphasized the
importance of limiting its opinion to the particular facts before it.
The court did not strike down the provision of the state constitution
permitting excess condemnation: "We do not hold that the provision
of the state Constitution might not be validly enforced in a proper
case, but that as applied by the city in these cases it violates the due
process clause of the [federal] Constitution."10
The major portion of the lots involved were purchased for later resale
at a profit rather than for any street-related or transportation-related
use. In fact, the Vester property was not included in the widening
scheme at all, and only one-sixth and one-fourth of the other two lots
were so included. It therefore seems safe to conclude that the Vester
prohibition is not against supplemental condemnation per se but only
acquisitions for the sole purpose of obtaining land to be sold at a
later time-in other words, land dealing at a profit.
A number of jurisdictions have upheld supplemental condemna-
tions. Generally such schemes have had their bases in either a con-
stitutional or a statutory provision. These provisions fall roughly
into four categories: (1) supplemental condemnation essential to the
operation of a public facility, (2) supplemental condemnation for
future use and the subsequent disposition of surplus property, (3)
8. A Municipality appropriating or otherwise acquiring property for public
use may in furtherance of such public use appropriate or acquire an excess
over that actually to be occupied by the improvement, and may sell such
excess with such restrictions as shall be appropriate to preserve the improve.
ment made.
Oao CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 10 (emphasis added).
9. 33 F.2d at 245.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
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supplemental condemnation to protect the value of the public facility
(the protective theory), and (4) supplemental condemnation for the
purchase of valueless remnants (the remnant theory).
1. Supplemental Condemnation Essential to the Successful Operation
of a Public Facility
Supplemental condemnation has been allowed when it is estab-
lished that the purposes for which the land is acquired are reasonably
essential to the successful operation of a municipal or special district
facility. One of the dearest statements of this principle is in At-
wood v. Willacy County Navigation District."' There, 1760 acres of
plaintiff's land were condemned by the Navigation District for a port
and supporting facilities as part of a plan to develop the navigable
waters of the state, all pursuant to express statutory authority. 2
Plaintiff contended that the statute was unconstitutional in that it
permitted the taking of property for a non-public purpose, and that
the legislature was attempting to adopt the recoupment theory of
eminent domain. Plaintiff objected specifically to the private develop-
ment and the industrial uses that were to take place on the property.
The court noted that the statute contained language expressly in-
dicating that such a taking of land for industrial development was
for a public purpose, and stated that great weight must be given
to such a declaration. 3 The court expressly rejected plaintiff's re-
11. 271 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 804
(1955).
12. All navigation districts organized under Article XVI, Section 59, of
the Constitution of Texas, whether created by Act of the Legislature or organ-
ized under General Law, shall have the right, power and authority to acquire
by gift, purchase or condemnation proceedings and to own lands adjacent or
accessible to the navigable waters and ports developed by them, that may be
necessary or required for any and all purposes incident to or necessary for the
development and operation of said navigable waters or ports within said dis-
trict, or that may be necessary or required for or in aid of the development of
industries on said lands, and may lease same or any part thereof to any in-
dividual or corporation and charge therefor reasonable tolls, rents, fees or other
charges, and use such proceeds both for the maintenance and operation of the
business of such districts and for the purpose of making themselves self-
supporting and financially solhert and returning the construction costs of their
improvements within a reasonable period. The acquisition of said lands for
said purposes and the operation and industrial development of such ports
and watenays are hereby declared to be a public purpose and a matter of
public necessity.
TEx. RLv. Civ. STAT. AN. art. 8263h, § 50 (1954) (emphasis added).
13. In particular, consider the last sentence of the statute quoted in note 12
supra.
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
coupment argument, and set out in strong language its support of an
expanded concept of public use. That the land acquired was essen-
tial for the successful operation of the district was an adequate justi-
fication for the condemnation:
[I]f a use be in fact public, it is not rendered otherwise by the ex-
pressed hope or desire of the Legislature that the district become
self-supporting and not remain a drain or charge upon the gen-
eral resources of the State.
We hold that the acquisition of land for the purpose of leasing
the same as industrial sites in the proximity of a port is reason-
ably necessary to the successful operation of such port.14
Two other cases are of particular note in the area of supplemental
condemnation. In the first, Opinion of the Justices,15 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts examined legislation empowering the
state turnpike authority to acquire sites abutting the highway and
to construct, or contract for the construction thereon of gasoline
stations, restaurants and other service facilities necessary to the
operation of the turnpike. The authority was also empowered to
lease those structures to private individuals for operation in such
manner and under such terms as the authority might determine.',
14. 271 S.W.2d at 142. Accord, Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326
S.W.2d 699 (1959); Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, 135 Tcx. 158, 143
S.W.2d 79 (1940); Jones v. City of Mineola, 203 S.W.2d 1020 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947); Weyel v. Lower Colorado River Authority, 121 S.W.2d 1032 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
15. 330 Mass. 713, 113 N.E.2d 452 (1953).
16. Ch. 354 [1952] Mass. Acts 267-70 provides:
Section 1. Massachusetts Turnpike.-The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority(hereinafter created) is hereby authorized and empowered, subject to the
provisions of this act, to construct, maintain, repair and operate at such
location as may be approved by the state department of public works a toll
express highway, to be known as the "Massachusetts Turnpike" ....
Section 4. Definitions.-
(b) The word "turnpike" shall mean the express toll highway or such part
or parts thereof as may be constructed under the provisions of this act,
together with and including all bridges, tunnels, overpasses, underpasses, inter-
changes, entrance plazas, approaches, connecting highways, service stations,
restaurants and administration, storage and other buildings and facilities
which the Authority may deem necessary for the operation of the turnpike,
together with all property, rights, easements and interests which may be ac-
quired by the Authority for the construction or the operation of the turnpike.
Section 5. General Grant of Powers.-The Authority is hereby authorized
and empowered . . . (f) To acquire sites abutting on the turnpike and to
[Vol. 8:73
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The court stated that it would be improper to judge what land was
needed for the construction of the highway and what land uses were
actually a part of the turnpike by the same standards as would be
applied to a country road. The project should be viewed as a whole,
taking into consideration its largest aspects:
In our opinion not only the worked portion of the roadway,
including, of course, bridges, abutments, embankments and ap-
proaches, but also the kinds of buildings and other structures
which we have mentioned [garages and gasoline stations] and a
reasonable amount of land taken or acquired on which to place
them are all "needed for the actual construction" of the highway
and are parts of it and will be taken or acquired for and devoted
to a public use, and land taken for such purposes will not be
"more land and property than are needed for the actual con-
struction" of the highway. We think therefore that reasonable
takings for these purposes may be authorized by the Legislature
.... Such takings will not be for resale to private individuals.
The provisions in § 5 (f) of the act for the leasing by the au-
thority of "gasoline stations, restaurants and other services" are
not unconstitutional. They do not involve the taking or holding
of lands for private purposes. Property leased will still be de-
voted to the public purpose of the turnpike, to which these
services are wholly subordinate.17
Similarly, in the second case, Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port
of New York Authority,s the Court of Appeals examined a statute
that authorized the New York Port Authority to develop, by condem-
nation where necessary, a massive port project known as the World
Trade Center. The proposed Center was broadly defined by statute.'9
construct or contract for the construction of buildings and appurtenances for
gasoline stations, restaurants and other services and to lease the same for the
above purposes in such manner and under such terms as it may determine....
17. 330 'Mass. at 723-24, 113 N.E.2d at 468 (emphasis added).
18. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375
U.S. 78 (1963).
19. Ch. 209, § 2, [1962] N.Y. Laws Vol. 1, 985 provides:
"World trade center" shall mean that portion of the port development
project constituting a facility of commerce consisting of one or more buildings,
structures, improvements and areas necessary, convenient or desirable in the
opinion of the port authority for the centralized accommodation of functions,
activities and services for or incidental to the transportation of persons, the
exchange, buying, selling and transportation of commodities and other
property in world trade and commerce, the promotion and protection of such
trade and commerce, governmental services related to the foregoing and
other governmental serices, including but not limited to custom houses, cus-
tom stores, inspection and appraisal facilities, foreign trade zones, terminal
19741
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The court upheld the statute, not only as to the public purpose aspects
of the Center, but also as to the use of eminent domain to condemn
property solely for raising revenue for project expenses. 20 The court
dearly implied that once a certain structure is devoted to project pur-
poses, portions of that structure could be leased for nonpublic uses to
produce incidental revenue to fund the project, and such production
of incidental revenue would not render the statute invalid.
This would represent an extension of the Atwood case in which
structures could be leased to private individuals or corporations be-
cause such structures were reasonably necessary for the success of the
primary project. In Atwood, the structures were leased to private
parties (shippers, etc.) directly involved with the port facility.21 In
Courtesy Sandwich, however, portions of certain facilities could be
leased to persons who had no connection with the World Trade Cen-
ter simply because the structures were as a whole devoted to an ac-
knowledged public purpose.
and transportation facilities, parking areas, commodity and security exchange
offices, storages, warehouse, marketing and exhibition facilities and other
facilities and accommodations for persons and property and, in the case ofbuildings, structures, improvements and areas in which such accommodation
is afforded, shall include all of such buildings, structures, improvements and
areas other than portions devoted primarily to railroad functions, activities
or services or to functions, activities or services for railroad passengers, not-
withstanding that other portions of such buildings, structures, improvements
and areas may not be devoted to purposes of the port development project
other than the production of incidental revenue available for the expenses of
all or part of the port development project.
(Emphasis added.)
20. Nor can it be said that the use of property to produce revenue tohelp finance the operation of those activities that tend to achieve the purpose
of the project does not itself perform such a function, provided, of course,
that there are in fact such other activities to be supported by incidental
revenue production . .. .
Even without resort to familiar canons of construction that control when
a statute is called into question on constitutional grounds, the statute, it
seems to us, allows only "portions" of structures otherwise devoted to project
purposes to be used for "the production of incidental revenue ... for the
expenses of all or part of the port development project." Thus considered it
does not vitiate the public purpose of the development as a whole .... As to
the fears expressed by the respondents that the Port Authority may illegally
seize a particular piece of property for an unauthorized nonpublic use, it is
sufficient to say that the condemnation procedures prescribed by statutefully protect the respondents and others in like position against any taking
for nonpublic purposes in violation of the Port Development Project Law.
12 N.Y.2d at 389-91, 190 N.E.2d at 405-06, 240 N.Y.S.2d at .......
21. See text at notes 11-14 supra.
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The supplemental condemnation of land that is reasonably essential
to the successful operation of a transit district produces a readily
apparent benefit. Under the above approaches, a transit district
would not be restricted to condemnation of the transit right-of-way,
but would be able to condemn supplemental land for parking and
other related facilities.
2. Supplemental Condemnation for Future Use and the Subsequent
Disposition of Surplus Property
There is a line of cases authorizing supplemental condemnation
for future expansion and use. Moreover, several cases recognize the
right of a condemning authority to utilize the land temporarily in an
income producing manner, and further, to sell the land for profit
should it become unnecessary to the project. As in other supplemental
condemnation cases, great stress is placed upon state constitutional
provisions and enabling statutes that set forth in detail the powers
and duties of the public body involved.
a. acquisition
One line of cases dealing with supplemental condemnation for
future use begins with the Supreme Court decision in Rindge Co. v.
County of Los Angeles2z in which the court said:
Public road systems, it is manifest, must frecuently be con-
structed in installments, especially where adjoining counties are
involved. In determining whether the taking of property is
necessary for public use not only the present demands of the
public, but those which may be fairly anticipated in the future,
may be considered. -3
The only limitation to the rule set forth here is that the use be
"reasonably" or "fairly" anticipated in the foreseeable future. A
transit district can enhance its ability to condemn in this fashion by
acting in accordance with definite, comprehensive plans and projec-
tions for future development of its facility. Of course, the legislature
should specifically permit the district to lease that property in the
interim for private use.
22. 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
23. Id. at 707. Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized the validity
of condemning for a future use. E.g., City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 408 Ill. 587,
97 N.E.2d 766 (1951).
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Courts have on occasion expressed in very strong terms the need to
be able to acquire land for a future use by supplemental condemna-
tion. In Rueb v. Oklahoma City2 4 the City sought plaintiff's land for
expansion of an airport. The evidence showed that the only immedi-
ate necessity for the taking was to eliminate an air traffic hazard, al-
though the city did have plans to construct a proposed runway over
the property in the future. Plaintiff conceded that the taking was
valid with respect to the "clear zone" (relating to the traffic hazard),
but he argued that only a part of his land would be devoted to this
purpose and thus appropriation of the total tract was an unconstitu-
tional excess condemnation. Quoting with approval a Florida de-
cision,25 the court held that both planning and condemnation for
future needs was not only valid but was actually a duty incumbent
upon city officials:
In erecting public buildings and public improvements, it is ...
the duty of public officials to build and plan not only for the pres-
ent but for the foreseeable future ... City officials would have
been derelict in the performance of their duties [had] they
planned only for the necessities of ten years ago without any
consideration for the necessities of the future .... The hands of
public officials should not be tied to the immediate necessities
of the present but they should be permitted, within reasonable
limitations, to contemplate and plan for the future.20
b. disposal
A related question centers around the disposal of surplus property
if the land condemned for future use is not ultimately needed. One
commentator notes that "when property is taken for the public use,
there cannot at the same time be taken additional adjacent property
which [is not intended to be devoted to] the public use, but which is
to be sold for profit as soon as the improvement is completed."2
He also states, however, that it is not objectionable for a statute, which
authorizes a taking, to provide that municipal authorities may sell
lands taken whenever they determine that such property is no longer
needed for a public use.28
24. 435 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1967).
25. Carlor Co. v. City of Miami, 62 So. 2d 897, 902-03 (Fla. 1953).
26. 435 P.2d at 141.
27. NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.223, at 7-61 to 7-62.
28. Id. at 7-62.
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Statutes that authorize surplus property to be sold have long been
held constitutional. As early as 1893, in discussing a statute that em-
powered a city to sell at public auction all lands it had acquired under
the act when it was determined that the parcels were no longer neces-
sary for the city's purposes, a New York court rejected the contention
that such a statute was in conflict with the constitutional prohibition
against taking private property for a public use:
Of course, the city could not take private property for the pur-
pose of selling it or dealing in it; but having once acquired it for
a park, and it becoming, in the course of time, unnecessary or
useless for that purpose, by the growth of the city or other
changes in the situation, a sale in the manner prescribed by the
statute would be within the legitimate functions of the city as a
municipal corporation, and power to that end, conferred by the
legislature at an), time, or in the act authorizing the taking, can-
not invalidate the delegated right to exercise the power of
eminent domain.2D
Similarly, in Townsend v. Housing Authority- it was held that the
public agency could dispose of surplus land when it determined that
the property was no longer needed for the public purpose it was orig-
inally intended to serve-in this instance, a housing project.3 1
3. The Protective Theory of Supplemental Condemnation
Jester also discussed a second theory that may support supplemen-
tal condemnation: the so-called "protective theory." 32 This theory
could enable a city owning land adjacent to a transit stop to sell it
Under restrictions that would preserve the beauty of, or at least reduce
the blight caused by, the transit system, and thereby facilitate an in-
crease in the value of the surrounding property.
An example of this theory is found in Culley v. Pearl River Indus-
trial Coimnission.** A water supply district was empowered to build
a dam, and pursuant to that power condemned enough property to
include a one-quarter mile outer perimeter, which the district alleged
was necessary for the public use in the protection and development of
29. In re City of Rochester, 137 N.Y. 243, 247, 33 N.E. 320, 321 (1893).
30. 277 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
31. Accord, Luby v. City of Dallas, 396 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
32. City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1929), aff'd on
other grounds, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
33. 234 Miss. 788, 108 So. 2d 390 (1959).
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the reservoir. The district was also authorized by statute to rent, lease
or sell land on the perimeter for the operation of recreational facilities
to be conducted for profit, with the original owner having first right of
repurchase. The Supreme Court of Mississippi had little difficulty in
finding these objectives to be valid:
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that it is necessary
and for a public use for the District to control at least the one-
quarter mile perimeter area. There is no evidence to the contrary.
That undisputed finding of fact settles the public necessity and
the public use in the District's power to utilize eminent domain
over the one-quarter mile perimeter, for purposes of this particu-
lar suit which is concerned with the constitutionality of the statute.
[T]he one-quarter mile perimeter is necessary for the public use
n the protection and development of the reservoir 4
In a similar Texas case 35 a special water district brought proceed-
ings to condemn an island formed when the district constructed a
dam to create a water reservoir. Plaintiff claimed that while the
district could exercise its powers to obtain the portion of his prop-
erty that would be inundated by the reservoir, it had no right to take
the remaining land (the island) since it bore no relation to the opera-
tion of the project. Therefore, he reasoned, the taking was for a
private use in violation of the Texas Constitution. The court found
his argument to be without merit:
It is true that the power of eminent domain is limited to the
uses of the taking, and that no more property, either in amount
or in interest or estate, than is required for such use may be ac-
quired.... But the function of determining this question of re-
quirement or necessity is generally held to be a legislative (politi-
cal power) and not a judicial one, and subject to review by the
courts only where there has been a palpable abuse of authority....
. The [ground] upon which the district claimed the fee to the
island necessary, [wvas] that its location in the reservoir rendered
it essential for policing purposes ....
34. Id. at 815-16, 108 So. 2d at 400 (emphasis added). See also United States
v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
35. McIlnnis v. Brown County Water Improvement Dist. #1, 41 S.W.2d 741
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
36. Id. at 745, 746 (emphasis added). The court also noted that the district
believed the island's natural beauty and location would make it desirable for
summer residences and that such a use would result in pollution of the reservoir. Id.
at 746. See also Massie v. City of Floydada, 112 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938).
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Similarly, in White v. Johnsonir a county highway commission con-
demned a right-of-way of 66 feet for a 36 foot wide roadway. In
affirming the supplemental taking, the court stated that a reasonable
width must be taken for the road in order to prevent construction of
structures of any kind, such as filling stations or signboards, that could
obscure the vision of travelers and increase the hazard of accidents.
4. The Remnant Theory of Supplemental Condemnation
Vester discusses yet another instance when supplemental condemna-
tion may be justified: the so-called "remnant theory." 38 By requiring
that an agency take only as much land as is needed for a street or
other public purpose, fragments of lots often remain of such size and
shape as to render them individually valueless. The city or other
condemning authority must then pay for the whole lot even though
it acquires title to only a part. Since the remaining lots are valueless,
the city would thereafter be deprived of taxes on this property.30
While the remnant theory alone will not provide a very useful mech-
anism for acquiring large segments of land around a transit stop in
order to control development, used in conjunction with other concepts
discussed herein it may provide sufficient land to more or less "fill in
the gaps."
Some state constitutions specifically authorize condemnation of rem-
nants ° A California statute 1 permitting condemnation of remnants,
,,7. 148 S.C. 488, 146 S.E. 411 (1929).
38. City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1929), aff'd on
other grounds, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
39. See generally D. HAGMiAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DFVELOPBIENT
CONTROL LAW § 177 (1971).
40. Eg., MASS. CONST. pt. 1, [§ 11] art X. It provides:
The legislature may by special acts for the purpose of laying out, widening
or relocating highways or streets, authorize the taking in fee by the common-
wealth .. .of more land and property than are needed for the actual con-
struction of such highway or street; provided, however, that the land and
property authorized to be taken are specified in the act and are no more
in extent than would be sufficient for suitable building lots on both sides of
such highway or street, and . . .may authorize the sale of the remainder for
value with or without suitable restrictions.
41. CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 104.1 (West 1956) provides:
Wherever a part of a parcel of land is to be taken for state highway purposes
and the remainder is to be left in such shape or condition as to be of little
value to its owner, or to give rise to claims or litigation concerning severance
or other damage, the department may acquire the whole parcel and may sell
the remainder or may exchange the same for other property needed for state
highway purposes.
1974]
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was construed and upheld in People v. Superior Court.4 2 The Supreme
Court of California held that even a "remnant" as large as 54 acres
could be condemned:
Although a parcel of 54 landlocked acres is not a physical rem-
nant, it is a financial remnant: its value as a landlocked parcel
is such that severance damages might equal its value. Remnant
takings have long been considered proper.43
In Luby v. City of Dallas4 the city condemned land upon which
plaintiff's cafeteria stood in order to widen and improve a street.
Plaintiff argued that some of this property was not used for the im-
provement and that therefore the taking was excessive and unconsti-
tutional. The court, however, noted that the small triangle of land
that would remain was wholly unsuitable for the operation of a cafe-
teria, and further, that this "surplus" would be used during repair of
a common wall on adjoining property.45
II. TAX ASSESSMFENTS
Aside from the general theories of excess or supplemental condem-
nation, it is possible that a method of taxation might be used to re-
capture for a transit authority some of the value enhancement accruing
to land located near transit stops.
A. Set-offs at Time of Condemnation
It is permissible, under certain circumstances, to deduct benefits
that accrue to a property owner from his condemnation award when
only a part of his property is taken by eminent domain, and the part
remaining can be demonstrated to be benefited by the improvement.
This deduction of the benefits accruing to the condemnee recaptures
some of the value conferred on the remaining land by the construction
of a nearby transit stop. The liberal rule permits the set-off of all
benefits, general and special, against total damages for the land taken
and the consequential damages to the remainder. 4a
42. 68 Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968).
43. Id. at 212-13, 436 P.2d at 346, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
44. 396 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
45. Id. at 196.
46. 3 NicHOLS, supra note 3, at § 8.6206. Special benefits are defined as those
accruing peculiarly to the condemnee's land and not generally to neighboring
property.
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B. Special Assessments
It is possible that the special assessment method, particularly a
variant of it used in California called "special benefit assessment,' '4
may be useful in recapturing for a transit district value expended in
constructing transit facilities. 48
Courts have held that once the improvement is determined to be-
stow a special benefit, incidental benefits to the general public will not
destroy its local character. For example, any street improvement will
certainly benefit the general public, but the special benefits to certain
landowners justify special assessments. In this same context, legisla-
tures or municipal authorities often determine that a project has both
special and general benefits and as a result, apportion the cost be-
tween special assessments and general revenue funds. Cities may thus
pay a major portion of the cost of a street improvement while assess-
ing local landowners for the balance.41 It may therefore be possible
for the transit agency to assess local owners for at least a portion of
the improvement cost. In any event, evidence must be marshalled
to show that transit lines or stops do indeed confer special benefits.5 0
Assuming that such a showing can be made, legislation could be
drafted that permits other governmental agencies to establish special
assessment districts around either the transit line itself or to limit
these districts to property adjacent to transit stops. The owners of
such land would be assessed a certain percentage of the cost of the
improvement with individual obligations based upon criteria such as
lot size, present property valuation, or possibly a combination of lot
size and distance from the transit station.
Most state courts have been reluctant to interfere with legislative
47. See text at and following note 55 infra.
4. The special assessment is designed to finance improvements by assessing
benefited landowners a percentage of the cost of the improvement. Special assess-
ments are typically used only for local improvements-streets, sidewalks, drainage
ditches-either because the state enabling laws specifically restrict their use to such
projects, or because of the underlying theory that since the assessment is measured
by the special benefit received by property, it is difficult to justify an assessment
for facilities that have regional benefits (benefits to the public as a whole with only
incidental private benefits). One noted authority, however, believes that since land
values usually increase dramatically near a stop on a mass transit line, the bene-
fits may differ in kind sufficiently to be considered special. See D. HAGMAN,
PUBLIC PLANNING & CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 360 (1973).
49. City of Dallas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 66 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933).
50. But see Alf v. Flick, 1 Ohio Misc. 17, 204 N.E.2d 418 (1962).
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decisions defining the boundaries of special benefit districts. Presum-
ably, the legislature could define benefit zones around transit stops
and, unless this determination is entirely without foundation, it is
likely to be upheld by the courts. For example, the creation of a water
and electric utility district that encompassed a whole city was upheld
in Bank of Commerce v. Huddleston.51 Similarly, in Simms v. City of
Mt. Pleasant52 the City had divided streets to be improved into dis-
tricts as the basis for compensating the paving contractor as the work
progressed. The court ruled that this determination would stand
absent proof of an undue burden on plaintiff's property.
A political or social disadvantage of the special assessment may arise
because it represents the purest application of the benefit principle.
Special assessments are highly regressive. Legal challenges, however,
have proved largely ineffective, as the recent case of Citizens for Under-
ground Equality v. City of Seattle53 illustrates. In 1968 the City of
Seattle declared a policy to promote and encourage the conversion of
overhead utility wiring to an underground system. The cost of "un-
dergrounding" in residential neighborhoods was to be financed by
the levy of special assessments with the city sharing the cost to a "sub-
stantial extent." Plaintiffs, arguing that their neighborhoods could
not afford the estimated assessment of $615 per homesite, and thus
could not take advantage of the city's contribution, claimed that the
statute authorizing the creation of the districts was unconstitutional.
In affirming the summary judgment for the city, the Court of Appeals
of Washington held that the state statutory scheme did not unconsti-
tutionally discriminate against the poor:
Whether or not the cost of the improvement shall be borne wholly
by the property benefited, wholly by the public at large, or in
part by the property benefited and in part by the public at large,
are questions solely within the jurisdiction of the municipal
officers to determine, and the courts have no power to control
their discretion in that regard .... Thus, each area has an equal
opportunity, and an opportunity upon the same terms as all
other areas of the city to underground its overhead utility wiring.64
Assuming that the special benefit assessment can play an important
role in financing a transit line, the next step will be to draft specific
51. 172 Ark. 999, 291 S.W. 422 (1927).
52. 12 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
53. 6 Wash. App. 338, 492 P.2d 1071 (1972).
54. Id. at 344, 492 P.2d at 1075 (emphasis in original).
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enabling legislation giving transit authorities the right to establish
special benefit districts. The State of California is a pioneer in this
area; its legislature promulgated comprehensive local transportation
statutes with a substantial "special benefit assessment" feature as early
as 1968.55 The California special benefit district legislation performs
several important functions. First, it represents a declaration by the
legislature that special benefits may accrue to property along a mass
transit line. Although a property owner may claim that his land re-
ceives no special benefit, the courts give great weight to this legislative
determination and probably will not question it unless it is clearly
erroneous. Secondly, the legislation specifically allows for the creation
of several special benefit districts within one transit district (around
each transit station). Moreover, each special benefit district itself
may contain separate zones. These provisions give a transit district
considerable flexibility in apportioning costs in direct proportion to
benefits. Instead of assessing only property adjacent to the transit
station, as in the typical street assessment, the district may set up
zones with assessments decreasing in proportion to the distance from
the transit stop.
III. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPRATION
While there may be some constraints associated with value recap-
ture by means of either supplemental condemnation or taxation, it
is possible that such constraints can be avoided by an intergovern-
mental entity partnership with each entity exercising its own more or
less traditional powers of eminent domain. As a preliminary matter,
a number of courts that have considered the construction of a rapid
transit system have held it to be a public use. On that basis, cities
and other governmental units involved in mass transit projects may
exercise their powers of eminent domain at least for acquisition of
the transit system right-of-way and often for considerably more.
Provided adequate statutory or constitutional authority exists,
it is fairly dear that governmental entities may enter into coopera-
tive agreements to exercise powers that each would otherwise be
incapable of exercising separately. As the cases illustrate, it is
not necessary that each cooperating unit be permitted to do every-
thing that all can do together. Thus, where a Minnesota court sus-
55. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 99000 et seq. (Deering 1970).
36. RHYNE, supra note 3, at §§ 13-1, 13-6.
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tained the power of a town and a city to sell bonds for the purchase of
a lot and the construction of a building for a combined city and town
hall, it is clear that the city could not build a town hall and vice versa
-yet together they could build a combined structure and share the
cost.57 On the other hand, it is unlikely that a transit district could
construct a school, and if a school were to be located near such a site,
an interlocal agreement could probably not provide for a governmen-
tal consortium to build it if transit district money or eminent domain
powers would be used in the process.
It is difficult, however, to see any objection to a number of entities,
formally or informally, agreeing in some fashion to act jointly in
developing land around a transit stop. Such joint development has
been the subject of a number of reports and analyses over the last
several yers.5 1 The principal methods are the use of eminent domain
in an organized fashion by a number of different entities, as noted
above, and the legislative creation of a joint development district
with the authority to exercise all necessary powers of eminent domain,
administration and so forth.
Acting in combination, a transit authority having the power to
condemn land for stations, rights-of-way, and perhaps parking, and a
city having the power to condemn for certain governmental purposes,
could develop a publicly oriented transit complex that might be of
great benefit in terms of community enhancement and even value
recapture, although perhaps not to the transit district alone.
Indeed, the city in some instances can do much alone. The city has
long been one of the primary units of government entrusted with
public responsibility. As early as 1914, in In Re City of New York,' D
proceedings by the city to condemn land for construction of its sub-
way system were upheld by the New York Supreme Court. Later
cases also show that governmental authorities are not limited to con-
demning land solely for the transit right-of-way itself. In Cleveland
v. City of Detroit6o the City was authorized by statute to take private
property for its public transportation system. Pursuant to this grant,
the city sought to condemn land for construction of subsurface bus
57. White v. City of Chatfield, 116 Minn. 371, 133 N.W. 962 (1911).
58. See BARTON-AsCHMAN ASSOCIATES, THE JOINT PROJECT CONCEPT: INTE-
GRATED TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS (1968); NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES CON-
FERENCE OF MAYORS, TRANSIT STATION JOINT DEVELOPMENT (1973).
59. 163 App. Div. 10, 147 N.Y.S. 1057 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
60. 322 Mich. 172, 33 N.W.2d 747 (1948).
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terminals for the improvement of its street railway system. Plaintiff
landowner opposed the taking on the ground that the city needed
only an easement for the purposes of such bus terminals and that the
taking of the fee would represent an unconstitutional excess taking.
He further argued that the air rights were not needed by the city
and that he should retain title to them. The court prefaced its de-
cision by noting: "There can be no doubt that the use of property
for transportation of the public is a public use thereof."61 It then
held that since there was no proof that the property acquired would
be used for a non-public purpose and since construction of the bus
terminals was essential to the transit system, plaintiff's claim was with-
out merit62
In Zachry v. City of San Antonio63 the City appropriated city park
land for a proposed underground parking garage. The court had
little difficulty in finding that such action was proper.64
Actual experience appears to run primarily to intergovernmental
cooperation rather than formation of joint development districts. In
Nashville, Tennessee, a transit authority was created in 1958 by the
state legislature as the city's regulatory agency for mass transit facili-
ties within Nashville and for a distance of seven miles beyond the
city limits. It was empowered to make rules, set rates, own and oper-
ate a system, construct or acquire transit or garage facilities, contract
with public transit companies, and exercise the power of eminent
domain. The actual service is provided by the publicly franchised
Nashville Transit Company which owns the buses. The city issues
bonds for the authority's financial needs. The Metropolitan Traffic
Commission provides most necessary signs. The Public Works De-
partment erects and maintains bus shelters. The Authority built a
61. Id. at 177, 33 N.W.2d at 749.
62. Id. See also State v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 2d 630, 424 P.2d 913(1967).
63. 296 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), aft'd, 157 Tex. 551, 305 S.W.2d
558 (1957).
64. Other precedents have approved the exercise of power to provide off-
street parking on the basis of a city's power to protect the "safety" of the
public .... The Amstater case also treats the power to provide such facilities
as an incident to the municipality's power to regulate traffic on its streets.
We conclude that the City had the power to provide off-street parking
facilities under its Charter.
296 S.W.2d at 302-03. Accord, Hayden v. City of Houston, 305 S.W.2d 798(Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
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garage and office facility which it leases to the company. All this was
done under the auspices of state enabling legislation.
The City of Toronto entered into an agreement with the transit
authority whereby the municipality acquired the necessary land (re-
taining the surplus for private development by "public tender"), and
the authority developed the transit system. The City "declared" rights
pertaining to the land-including air rights-to be surplus, after which
it invited long-term leases for development in accordance with exist-
ing zoning and lease terms (including a "sketch" of the develop-
ment) .66
It is also worth noting that three recent transit system schemes in-
volving fixed-guideways-San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and To-
ronto-all presume the validity of, and in some cases have made
special use of, zoning to encourage development coincident with public
goals along transit lines and adjacent to transit stops.07 In addition,
most if not all of the modem transit systems utilizing a separate
transit authority or district rely on a separate, detailed and specific
state enabling statute.68
IV. AIR AND SUBSURFACE RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT
Presumably, once a mass transit system is constructed, the transit
authority will own both the air space above its right-of-way and sub-
surface development rights below it. Air rights may be of use in the
development of a mass transit system in two ways. First, a transit
authority may be able to develop air rights above the transit line for
uses related to the transit system (e.g., parking garages). Secondly,
air space can be sold or leased to private developers, thereby enabling
a transit district to recoup a large portion of its cost. Nonetheless,
65. ALAN M. VOORHEES & ASSOCIATES, AN ACTION PROGRAM FOR TRANSIT
IMPROVEMENT 53-58 (1971).
66. LANGFELD 15-16.
67. See generally LANGFELD.
68. See generally R. DILLON & J. BAILEY, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF
PREE TRANSIT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 70-71 (1970); LANOFELD; ALAN
M. VOORHEES & ASSOCIATES, supra note 65, at 58; ALAN M. VOORHEES & Asso-
CIATES, AN INTEGRATED ISLAND-WIDE Bus SYSTEI (1971).
For examples of such statutes, models and procedures see LANGFELD 24-25;
PORTLAND MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY COMm'N, PORTLAND MASS TRANSIT STUDY-
PHASE 1-A: MUNICIPAL ACQUISITION 20-24 (1969); ALAN M. VOORHEES
& ASSOCIATES, supra note 65, at 51; ALAN M. VOORHEES & ASSOCIATES, AN IN-
TEGRATED ISLAND-WIDE Bus SYSTEM, Part IV (1971); Recent Developments in
Air Space Utilization, 5 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 347, 361-64 (1970).
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the legal problems generally associated with air rights development
can be considerable.-
It is fairly well settled that air space is subject to private ownership
separate and apart from the land surface, and further, that air space
may be conveyed, leased and subdivided in approximately the same
manner as land30 Yet, while a state legislature usually has the power
to authorize such private use, it is generally held that without such
legislative authority a city or other governmental unit cannot permit
such private use of public air space.7 '
A number of states presently permit municipalities or state highway
agencies to utilize the space above or below streets and highways for
various public uses. 7 2 Moreover, many states have enacted legislation
to allow leasing of air space above public buildings, streets and high-
ways to private businesses when it is no longer needed for a public pur-
pose. Illinois has adopted a statute that empowers every municipality
to deal in air space.7 3 New Jersey has apparently authorized the state
69. N. LOBDELL, LAND USE INVOLVING TRANSPORTATION RIGHTS-OF-WAY 4
(1967).
70. R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 259-60 (1968). See also United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). In Causby the Supreme Court protected
the surface owner's right to possession of usable airspace above his land.
71. 10 M QUILLIN, supra note 3, at § 30.84; Hodgman, Air Rights and Public
Finance: Public Use in a New Guise, 42 So. CALIF. L. REv. 625, 629, 645 (1969);
Wright, Airspace Utilization on Highway, Rights of Way, 55 IOWA L. REv. 761,
783-84, 787 (1970). See also People ex tel. Armanetti v. City of Chicago, 415
1I. 165, 112 N.E.2d 616 (1953); Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C. 277, 111
S.E.2d 573 (1959).
72. 10 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at § 28.42; Wright, supra note 71, at 780-82.
Typically, the public use will be for parking.
73. ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 24, § 11-75-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962) provides:
Every municipality has the power to lease the space above and around
buildings located on land owned or otherwise held by the municipality to
any person for any term not exceeding 99 years.
Ev ery municipality has the power to lease, in the same manner and for a
similar term, any space over any street, alley, or other public place, in the
municipality, more than 12 feet above the level of the street, alley, or other
public place, to the person who owns the fee or a leasehold estate, for a term
not less than that of the proposed lease, in the property on both sides of the
portion of the street, alley, or other public place so to be leased, whenever
the corporate authorities of the municipality are of the opinion that that
space is not needed for street, alley, or other public purpose, and that the
public interest will be subserved by such leasing. The leasing of such a space
shall be authorized by ordinance. In this ordinance the lease and its terms
shall be set forth with reasonable certainty.
See also MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40, § 22E (Supp. 1969); N.Y. VMLAGE LAw §
89 76 (McKinney Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 47.12.120 (1970).
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to sell air rights to a municipality, which in turn can lease them to a
private party for a non-municipal use for as long as 99 years.74 In
Wisconsin, cities and villages may lease air space over streets, alleys
and other public places to adjoining property owners.75 Since 1969,
Washington has permitted the rental or leasing of air space above or
below any lands held for highway purposes.70 Connecticut not only
authorizes its highway commission to sell, lease and convey any in-
terest the state may have on, above or below any state right-of-way,
but also to accept, purchase or condemn additional interests in land
or air space necessary to the multiple use and joint development of
highway rights-of-way.77
An increasing number of states also have adopted special provisions
dealing with the sale or leasing of air development rights above high-
ways. The California Highway Department may lease the use of areas
above and below state highways to public agencies or private parties,
provided the proposed use is not in conflict with local zoning and
appropriate measures are taken to protect the safety and adequacy of
the highway facility as well as adjacent land uses.78 A recent Ohio
statute permits the leasing or sale of air rights over state highways
for any non-highway purpose that, in the opinion of the state high-
way agency, will not impair the use of the highway.7 D In New Jersey
the state may lease land no longer required for highway purposes to
a municipality, which may in turn lease the air rights to a private
party for non-municipal uses.80
CONCLUSION
Times being what they are, the construction of many public im-
provements that do not fall into the "necessary-to-avert-disaster" cate-
gory will depend upon some method of reducing the heavy financial
drain on the public purse. A demonstrably legal and profitable way
of reducing the drain is the recoupment of expenditures through the
74. BARTON-ASCHMAN AssocIATEs, MULTIPLE USE OF LANDS WITHIN HIOH-
WAY RIGHTS-oF-WAY 55-56 (1968). See note 80 and accompanying text infra.
75. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.048(3) (1967).
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 47.12.120 (1970).
77. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13A-80(a) (Supp. 1969).
78. CAL. STS. & H'WAYs CODE § 104.12 (West Supp. 1969).
79. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5501.162 (1970).
80. N.J. Rtv. STAT. § 46:3-19 (1940).
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sale or lease of a portion of the property condemned that is not crucial
to the construction of the improvement. While it may be difficult
to exercise legally the power of eminent domain solely for the purpose
of dealing in excess land, more than enough judicial support exists
for incidental profit-making by use and dealing in excess land pro-
vided one can find some statutory or constitutional support.
Supplemental condemnation, however, is not the only arrow in the
value recapture quiver. Some form of assessment procedure has long
been used by municipal authorities to defray the cost of public im-
provements that confer special benefits on certain property owners.
The difference between a street or sidewalk on the one hand, and a
fixed-guideway rapid transit system on the other, may well be char-
acterized as one of degree only.
Moreover, local governments have a history of cooperation in under-
taking ventures by a pooling of their respective powers and resources
that, if undertaken separately, would have proved difficult if not im-
possible to accomplish. Such ventures have recently included develop-
ment around transit stops and rights-of-way. Less common, but equally
effective, is the formation of joint development districts or authorities
to accomplish the same ends.
Finally, it is fairly well settled that a governmental unit may own
and, within certain limits, deal in as well as use air and subsurface
development rights. Their sale or rental will be useful in defraying
the cost of public improvements.
No one of these techniques may suit every circumstance, and some
are clearly more likely than others to produce vast amounts of revenue
in densely urban concentrations or high-value property districts.
Nonetheless, a judicious blending of these techniques by well-informed
decision-makers may sufficiently defray the costs of making needed
public improvements. To the extent that such projects were shelved
because of increasing construction costs, they would once again be-
come feasible. The financial community has generally risen to the
occasion when circumstances have demanded it. It behooves govern-
ment to do likewise.
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